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STATE V. RABB:
DOG SNIFFS CLOSE TO HOME
TIMOTHY C. STONEt

INTRODUCTION

Sensory perception is an inextricable part of Fourth
Amendment' jurisprudence. 2 A policeman's sense of smell, for
example, can create probable cause 3 for a lawful search or
seizure. 4 A canine's sense of smell operates much like our own,
except that its sensory instrument-the snout-is exponentially

t J.D. Candidate, June 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., cum
laude, 2004, New York University.
1
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 Probable cause can result from that which an officer sees, see Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990) (explaining plain view doctrine), hears, see
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) ("The risk of being overheard by an
eavesdropper... is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the
kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak." (quoting Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting))), or even feels, see
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 377 (1993) (reasoning that a "suspect's
privacy interests are not advanced by a categorical rule barring the seizure of
contraband plainly detected through the sense of touch").
3 Probable cause to search exists when, "given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before [the issuing magistrate] .... there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
4 See Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (finding a search
unconstitutional in light of the prohibition officers' failure to procure a warrant, but
stating that "[law enforcement] may rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact
indicative of a possible crime"); Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1038 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2003) (describing sense of smell as the third most "productive of
incriminating data," behind sight and sound, and discussing Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948), in which the smell of burning opium from inside a
room generated probable cause for a search), affd, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).
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stronger than the human-noge. 5 This potency explains the dog
6
sniffs long history as a law enforcement tool.
As a legal matter, it is undisputed that the "alert"7 of a
trained dog to contraband generates probable cause for a search
or seizure. 8 However, a discrete and more contested issue is
whether 9 the sniff itself constitutes a Fourth Amendment
"search." Beginning with its 1983 decision in United States v.
Place,10 the Supreme Court has held-at least under some
circumstances-that it does not." The Court reasoned that two

5 See Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the
Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 KY. L.J. 405, 408-10 (1997) (examining the "science
behind the sniff"); Shannon R. Hurley-Deal, Comment, State v. Fisher: Canine Sniffs
- Who Let the Dogs Out?, 26 N.C. CENT. L.J. 47, 51 (2003) ("If laid out, the surface
area of a dog's olfactory cells would cover a space equivalent to the skin area of the
dog's body. In comparison, the surface area of human olfactory cells would cover no
more than a postage stamp.") (footnotes omitted).
6 The use of the dog sniff is "deeply ingrained in our general culture."
Fitzgerald,837 A.2d at 1037.
We know that a canine "non-alert" may be as probative as an "alert," as, in
Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes explained the significance of "the dog that
did not bark in the night." In The Odyssey, Homer recounts how Ulysses's
incognito return to Ithaca, after an absence of twenty years, was almost
compromised when his faithful dog, Argos, alerted to the smell of his long
missing master.
Id. at 1037-38.
7 "An alert is an indication from a trained dog that the odor of an illegal drug is
present." Bird, supra note 5, at 406 n.3.
8 See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (stating that a positive
result from a dog's sniff "would have resulted in [the defendant's] justifiable arrest
on probable cause"); JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
§ 4:9 n.67 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2005) (listing cases).
9 The ramifications of that initial determination-whether a government
activity is a search and, therefore, a Fourth Amendment "event" that triggers
constitutional protections-are extremely important. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky,
Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MiSS. L.J. 143, 150 (2002)
("[I]nvestigative tactics that are not deemed 'searches' or 'seizures' escape judicial
review altogether under the Fourth Amendment.").
io 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
11 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) ("[T]he use of a well-trained
narcotics-detection dog ...during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate
legitimate privacy interests."); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 52-53
(2000) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("We have already held, however, that a 'sniff test'
by a trained narcotics dog is not a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because it does not require physical intrusion of the object being sniffed
and it does not expose anything other than the contraband items."); Place, 462 U.S.
at 707 ("[Exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a
trained canine-did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.")
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of the sniffs principal characteristics-non-intrusiveness 12 and
limited
information-capture 13-exempt
it
from
Fourth
Amendment scrutiny as a sui generis law enforcement
technique. 14
That is to say, the information that a sniff
generates-a very blunt "'yea' or 'nay'" as to whether
contraband exists 15-implicates
a privacy expectation in the
contraband's owner that society does not accept as objectively
reasonable under the famed Katz test.1 6 The Court, however,
12 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (emphasizing the 'limited... manner in which the

information is obtained"). The facts of Place and its progeny involved dogs sniffing
property. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 (involving a car); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35
(pertaining to automobiles); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984)
(regarding a Federal Express package); Place, 462 U.S. at 697-98 (focusing on
personal luggage). Undoubtedly, a sniff directed at one's person is much more
intrusive. Cf. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 421 ("A drug-detection dog is an intimidating
animal.") (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1980)
(lamenting the "extraordinary atmosphere" during a school-wide drug search in
which "[e]very single student was sniffed, inspected, and examined at least once by a
dog") (Swygert, J., dissenting); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device
for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1246-47 (1983) ("[T]he very act of
being subjected to a body sniff by a German Shepherd may be offensive at best or
harrowing at worst to the innocent sniffee."); Jon S. Vernick et al., Technologies to
Detect Concealed Weapons: Fourth Amendment Limits on a New Public Health and
Law Enforcement Tool, 31 J. AM. SOC'Y L. MED. & ETHICS 567, 571 (2003) (" '[Tihe

body and its odors are highly personal' and 'dogs often engender irrational fear.' ")
(quoting B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1267 (9th Cir. 1999)).
13 Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (pointing to the "limited ...content of the information
revealed" by a dog sniff); see also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 ("[A]n exterior sniff of an
automobile ... is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or
absence of narcotics."). This idea has been referred to as a 'limited disclosure
theory." Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39
SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 707-08 (1988).
14 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 ("[T]he canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of
no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the
information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the
procedure.").
15 Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1030 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), affid, 864
A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004). This idea has also been referred to as "the binary search
doctrine." The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 169,
186-87 (2005).
16 Most jurists and scholars view Katz as a profound turning point in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The Katz Court (arguably) departed from the longaccepted idea-derived from common law notions of property-that violation of the
Fourth Amendment presupposes the occurrence of a physical trespass. See, e.g.,
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-32 (2001) (discussing the previous role of
common-law trespass in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and stating that the
Court has "since decoupled violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights from
trespassory violation of his property"); Sklansky, supra note 9, at 152 (writing that
Katz "appeared to revolutionize the test for determining.., whether [an activity] is
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muddied the waters' 7 in Kyllo v. ,United States,'8 when it found
that thermal imagers used for surveillance implicate Fourth
Amendment protections. 19 In Kyllo, a federal agent aimed a
thermal imager at a residential apartment and detected heat
discrepancies around its walls; based on this information, the
agent correctly inferred that the apartment's occupant was
20
employing heat-generating lamps in order to grow marijuana.
Surprisingly, the Kyllo Court found the defendant's interest in
the heat-a byproduct of activity inside the home-to comprise a
privacy expectation that society was prepared to recognize as
reasonable. 21 A factor contributing to the Court's decision was
a 'search' or 'seizure' "). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801,
807 (2004) (claiming that the Katz test "has proven more a revolution on paper than
in practice"); Sklansky, supra note 9, at 163 (calling Justice Scalia's criticism of the
Katz test, among other things, "self-indulgent" (quoting Minnesota. v. Carter, 525
U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring))). Justice Harlan expounded upon the test
in his famous Katz concurrence, in which he proffered a two-pronged inquiry to
determine whether government activity comprises a "search," and, thus, whether it
implicates either the Fourth Amendment's warrant or reasonableness requirements.
The first prong asks whether an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in
his own activity or property. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring), superseded on other grounds by statute, Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000), and Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000). The second, more
dispositive component, requires that the privacy expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id.; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
219 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (reviewing the methodology of Fourth Amendment
decisions grounded in the dual-prong framework); Sklansky, supra note 9, at 157
(explaining that the subjective prong has the "odd consequence that people who
suspect the government are spying on them may lose, for that very reason, much of
their protection against what they fear," and that, consequently, the Court relies
more on the objective component).
17 See, e.g., State v. Rabb, No. 4D02-5139, 2006 WL 349493, at *6 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Feb. 15, 2006) (viewing Kyllo as controlling the Fourth Amendment treatment
of a sniff conducted outside a house); infra notes 25-68 and accompanying text
(discussing Rabb). 'Muddied" should not imply a negative connotation. See Kerr,
supra note 16, at 837 & n.215 (writing that Kyllo has been "hailed as a 'landmark'"
among scholars, and referencing numerous sources with similar language).
18 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
19 Id. at 40 ("Where ... the Government uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.").
20 Id. at 29-30.
21 Id. at 34-35 (discussing the Katz test and holding that "the information
obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search"); see also
Sklansky, supra note 9, at 144 (noting the "ideological oddity" of the Kyllo Court's
voter composition).
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that the case dealt with surveillance of a home, a place
22
traditionally afforded heightened constitutional protection.
Kyllo is arguably a departure from the sui generis modelwhereby a sniff is not a search due to its non-intrusiveness and
24 If
limited information-capture 23-in the context of the home.
this reading of Kyllo is correct, then a dog sniff outside a private
residence is a Fourth Amendment search-a conclusion that at
least one court has reached. In State v.Rabb,2 5 police received an
anonymous tip that James Rabb 26 was growing cannabis in his
house. 2 7 After partly corroborating the tip, officers placed the
suspect's residence under surveillance. 28 When Rabb left his
house by car, officers followed him and eventually pulled him
over for commission of a traffic infraction. 29 The police observed
22 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 ("[Alny physical invasion of the structure of the home,

" (quoting Silverman v. United
'by even a fraction of an inch,' [is] too much ....
States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590
(1980) ("In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of
persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the
house."); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511-12 n.4 ("A man can still control a small part of
his environment, his house .... That is still a sizable hunk of liberty-worth

protecting from encroachment." (quoting United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315
(2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), affd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952))).
23 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (discussing the sniff as a nonintrusive method of obtaining only a limited amount of information).
24 Cf. David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1090 (2004) ("[Ihe decisions in Kyllo
and Place seem completely inconsistent."); Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Comment,
Constitutional Law: Ratifying Suspicionless Canine Sniffs: Dog Days on the
Highways, 57 FLA. L. REV. 963, 973-74 & n.103 (2005) ('Will the Court apply the
analysis in Kyllo to a suspicionless canine sniff of the home in the future, or will it
adopt the view ...that a canine sniff is not a search in any context?"). But see
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (stating that a thermal imager's
capacity to reveal intimate, non-incriminating details in a home underpinned Kyllo's
holding); Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1036 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003)
(reconciling Kyllo and Place by distinguishing a thermal imager from a dog sniff in
that the former detects only "circumstantial evidence of crime" while the latter
identifies "the very gravamen of crime itself"), affld, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004);
Morgan v. State, 95 P.3d 802, 807 (Wyo. 2004) (stressing that a thermal imager,
unlike a dog sniff, captures innocuous information about its target); Vernick et al.,
supra note 12, at 573 (arguing that the Place line of cases were not relevant to
Kyllo); infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
25 920 So.2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
26 Id. at 1178 & n. 1. The tip, however, identified Rabb as "John Brown." Id.
27 Id. at 1178.
28 Id.
29 Id. A pretextual traffic stop is constitutional so long as it is based on probable
cause. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (reviewing precedent
and concluding that it "foreclose[s] any argument that the constitutional
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that Rabb appeared visibly nervous, and for good reason: an
3°
assortment of cannabis cultivation literature was in plain view.
A drug-detection dog was then led around the vehicle and alerted
to its exterior;3 1 a search of the car revealed one marijuana
cigarette. 32 At this point, the officers brought the dog to the
defendant's home and led it up the public roadway to the front
33
door, where it again alerted to the presence of marijuana.
Based on the preceding events, a magistrate issued a warrant for
police to search Rabb's house. 34 The search yielded, among other
35
things, sixty-four cannabis plants.
The trial court found the dog sniff of Rabb's house to
constitute a warrantless search. 36 Without the canine's positive
alert, the warrant application was deemed insufficient to create
probable cause and the evidence seized from the home was
consequently suppressed.3 7 The Florida Fourth District Court of
Appeals affirmed, 38 and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, 39 vacated the judgment, 40 and instructed the
Fourth District to reconsider the case in light of Illinois v.

reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual
officers involved").
30 Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1178.
31 Id. at 1179.
32 Id. Rabb also voluntarily relinquished marijuana hidden in his sock. Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.

35 Id. Police also recovered two MDMA tablets, Alprazolam tablets, and three
additional marijuana joints. Id.
36 Id. at 1180.
37 Id. The exclusionary rule makes evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending federal exclusionary rule to states).
38 State v. Rabb, 881 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2004), vacated, 544 U.S.
1028 (2005) ("Based on the reasonable expectation of privacy recognized by both law
and society to be associated with a house, law enforcement's use of the dog sniff
without a warrant constituted a search that was not permitted by the Fourth
Amendment.").
39 Rabb, 544 U.S. at 1028.
40 Id.
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Caballes.41
On remand, the Florida court reaffirmed the
42
evidence-suppression order as consistent with Caballes.
I.

THE MAJORITY AND DISSENTING VIEWS

As previously stated, the Rabb court found Kyllo
dispositive, 43 stressing that the context of a sniff is
determinative. 44 It analogized a thermal imager to a dog sniff,
41 543 U.S. 405 (2005). In Caballes, the defendant was pulled over by a state
trooper for speeding. Id. at 406. A second trooper overheard the radio dispatch
reporting the stop and traveled to the scene with his drug-detection dog. Id. The
canine was led around the defendant's car and alerted at the trunk, the search of
which yielded marijuana. Id. The defendant was consequently convicted of a
narcotics offense. Id. at 407. The Supreme Court held that the seized evidence was
admissible, id. at 409-10, thereby reaffirming the "limited disclosure theory,"
Gutterman, supra note 13, at 707-08, under which government activity that reveals
only the presence of contraband "compromise[s] [no] legitimate interest in privacy."
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123
(1984)). The Court distinguished two ideas: an individual's bare and unprotected
expectation that certain facts remain hidden from authorities, and an objectively
reasonable privacy interest that satisfies the second prong of the Katz test. Id. at
408-09; see supra note 16 (explaining the two-part Katz test). The Court viewed the
defendant's marijuana-concealment expectation as fitting squarely into the former
category. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. Note that a privacy expectation in per se
unlawful property (or activities) is always unreasonable, because reasonableness
implies lawfulness under at least some circumstances. For example, while it is
reasonable for an adult to drink five beers, it is normally unreasonable for that same
adult to drink five beers and then immediately drive an automobile. Narcotics
possession, on the other hand, is uniformly unreasonable despite the context in
which it occurs. This explains the Court's choice of words in describing the privacy
expectation at issue in limited disclosure cases: instead of "reasonable[ness]" as in
Katz v.United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), the Court
speaks of whether the defendant has a 'legitimate" privacy interest. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. at 123; see also Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1027 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2003) (noting the change in language), aff'd, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004). The logic
underpinning this switch is consistent with the Court's position that "[t]he concept of
an interest in privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its
very nature, critically different from the mere expectation, however well justified,
that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities." Jacobsen, 466
U.S. at 122. This idea also informs the bifurcated structure of the Katz test: simply
because an individual has a privacy expectation under the first prong does not
presuppose society's acceptance of that same expectation as objectively reasonable
under the second prong. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42 See State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175, 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The
Florida Constitution contains a provision nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment,
and provides that the right which it bears "shall be construed in conformity with the
4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court." FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 12.
43 Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1182.
44 See id. at 1186 ("Put simply, we view the reasonable expectation of privacy
afforded to locations along a hierarchy from public to private.").
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and distinguished prior sniff jurisprudence by positing that
location-the place of the alleged search-underpins the sui
generis model. 45 The court cited Kyllo for the proposition that the
"quality or quantity" of the captured information is not the
"Fourth Amendment concern." 46 Instead, the decision focused on
the heightened protection afforded the home under Fourth
Amendment caselaw, 47 reasoning that all details inside the home
48
are "intimate," and therefore warrant constitutional protection.
Hence, that a dog sniff "provides limited information regarding
only the presence or absence of contraband" is irrelevant. 49 The
critical issue is rather that the government "endeavored at all to
employ sensory-enhancing methods to cross the firm line at the
entrance of a house. '50 The court also emphasized that Caballes
5
dealt with a vehicle stopped on a public interstate highway, '
while the Rabb sniff transpired outside a private home, a place
that stands "strong and alone, shrouded in a cloak of Fourth
Amendment protection." 52
Moreover, it distinguished both
Caballes and Place from the facts at hand, stating that "[v]ehicles
45 See id. at 1184. The court cited United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d
Cir. 1985), to support its position that "place" underpins the limited disclosure
inquiry. Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1184. Thomas construed United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983) narrowly to cover only the site of the alleged search-a public airportand concluded that "a practice that is not intrusive in a public airport may be
intrusive when employed at a person's home." Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1184 (Thomas, 757
F.2d at 1366). The Rabb court also distinguished Nelson v. State, 867 So.2d 534 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004), in which no search was found when law enforcement led a
narcotics detection canine through a public hotel corridor in order to perform sniffs
at each door. See Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1185. Once again, the Rabb court emphasized
the role of location, stating that a hotel room is "neither as private nor as sacrosanct"
as a house and that the Nelson sniffs occurred in a hallway, a "public area" that
warrants even less Fourth Amendment protection. Id. at 1186.
46 Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1190 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37
(2001)).
47 Id. at 1183 (discussing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), and
Kyllo); see also infra notes 58, 64 and accompanying text.
48 Rabb, 920 So.2d at 183; see also infra note 112.
49 Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1184.
50

Id. at 1190.

51 Id. at 1189. The majority pointed to the lesser degree of Fourth Amendment

scrutiny historically afforded vehicles on public roads. Id. (citing California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1985)).
52 Id.; see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (stating that the
"Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house" and
affirming the warrant requirement for in-home arrests). But see id. at 615 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment is concerned with protecting people, not
places, and no talismanic significance is given to the fact that an arrest occurs in the
home rather than elsewhere.").
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on public roadways and luggage in airports are simply different
[than a house] because the privacy to be invaded... is
necessarily limited by the size of the vehicle or bag. . .."53
The dissent argued that context is irrelevant: a sniff is a
54
non-search due to its extremely limited information-capture.
As such, to change the location of the sniff is not to destroy its sui
55
generis character, so long as its locus is open to the public.
Furthermore, the dissent stressed that by remanding the case for
further consideration in light of Caballes, the Supreme Court
endorsed the idea that a sniff-provided it occurs on
constitutionally unprotected ground-detects only the presence of
56
contraband, "in which there is no legitimate privacy interest."
The fact that the marijuana scent originated inside a home was
therefore constitutionally irrelevant. 57 As long as the site from
which the dog sniff occurred was not itself protected 5 8 -and in
this case the dissent argued that it was not 59-there could be no
search. Finally, the dissent distinguished Kyllo on two grounds.
First, a thermal imager is unlike a dog sniff because it can
capture lawful, intimate details about its target. 60 Second, Kyllo
sought to protect individual privacy from the "advance of
technology."6 1 Since law enforcement's use of the dog sniff
53 Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1190.
54 See id. at 1197 (Gross, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Place, 462

U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
55 See id. ("There is no legal distinction between officers in an airport with the
suspect's luggage, as in Place, and the officers and dog at the front door of Rabb's
residence in this case.") Wherever the sniff may occur, the result is always the same:
there is or there isn't contraband present.
56 Id. at 1198.
57 That the focus of the sniff is a home lacks significance because "[tihe higher
level of justification required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment when it applies ... is
not to be confused with the very different issue of whether the amendment
applies.... [The amendment does not protect against] non-searches and nonseizures, reasonable or unreasonable." Id. at 1199 (quoting Fitzgerald v. State, 837
A.2d 989, 1030 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), affid, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004)).
58 See id. at 1193.
59Id. (utilizing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986), as support for
the proposition that "the space in front of the door enjoyed no constitutional
protection").
60 Id. at 1201 ("[Thermal imagers] might disclose.., at what hour each night
the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath .. ")(quoting Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001)).
61 Id. at 1201 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 n.3
(discussing "scientifically feasible" technology that would allow police to see through
walls); see also id. at 40 (declaring that the Court "must take the long view" towards
the Fourth Amendment as preparation for the onslaught of new, more intrusive
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predates American colonialism, 62 the Court could not have
intended that sniff jurisprudence fall within the ambit of its
holding.63
The majority responded to the dissent by drawing a
philosophical line in the sand between its own approach that
Fourth Amendment search inquiries should depend upon
"whether the place at which the search occurred was subject to a
legitimate expectation of privacy," and the dissent's focus on
"whether the item searched for was subject to a legitimate
expectation of privacy." 64 It reasoned that adherence to the
dissent's model, whereby search status is "solely a function of
whether the item searched for is illegal," would theoretically
allow police to "marchn a dog up to the doors of every house on a
65
street hoping the dog sniffs drugs inside."
The disagreement in Rabb stems from an apparent Fourth
Amendment inconsistency: Place's sui generis principle, 66 and
Kyllo's so-called "protection-of-intimate-details" rule. 67 As one
commentator put it: "Both cases involved the use of a senseenhancing device that was not in general public use, that did not
require a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area,
and that revealed only limited information. And yet the cases
reached opposite results."68 To reconcile the two would answer
the question:
is a dog sniff outside of a home a Fourth
Amendment search?
This Comment submits that the correct answer is no: so long
as the dog stands on constitutionally unprotected ground, its
sniff is a non-search. As such, this Comment argues that both
the holding and the rationale of Rabb are incorrect. Whether a

surveillance technology).
62 See Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1202 (Gross, J., dissenting) ("Bloodhounds have been
chasing escaping prisoners and other fugitives through the swamps for hundreds of
years .... ." (quoting Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1037 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2003), affd, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004)).
63 See id.
64 Id. at 1190 (majority opinion).
65 Id. "Such an 'ends justifies the means' approach to the Fourth Amendment is
simply not what the Founders intended when they embodied a barrier at the door of
the home in the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1190-91.
66 See supra note 14 & accompanying text.
67 See supra note 19. See generally Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1192 ("The United States
Supreme Court has yet to address the intersection of the logic of Caballes and Place
with the historical protection of the home and Kyllo.").
68 Steinberg, supra note 24, at 1090.
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dog sniff triggers Fourth Amendment protections is an issue
generally unaffected by location. Part II.A of this Comment
asserts that Kyllo was not meant to alter the Supreme Court's
dog sniff jurisprudence, and therefore Rabb's reliance on that
case is misguided. Part II.B suggests that Kyllo would have been
decided in the same fashion had the focus of the disputed
surveillance not been a home, which refutes Rabb's premise that
Kyllo principally sought to strengthen the home's Fourth
Amendment protection. Part II.C points out the absence of
Supreme Court precedent indicating any intent to abandon the
sui generis treatment of the dog sniff. Part II.D emphasizes that
the Fourth Amendment does not protect wrongdoers from the
government detecting evidence of their crimes, particularly when
such detection is the product of a sense-enhancing instrument
that captures exclusively unlawful information and that is
employed from constitutionally unprotected ground. Finally,
Part II.E discusses the Fourth Amendment significance of the
physically non-invasive quality of a dog sniff.

II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
A.

The Court's Misinterpretationof Kyllo

The Rabb court incorrectly read Kyllo as evidence that Place
and its progeny concern location. It is undisputed that the
home-one context in which government searches and seizures
can occur-merits special treatment under Fourth Amendment
0
jurisprudence, 69 and that this was one important factor in KylloJ
Yet the preference afforded the home is not absolute, 71 as proven
69 The home has long received a higher level of Fourth Amendment protection
than other locations. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. See generally
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core [of the
Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
70 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (positing that, within the
home, all details are intimate and worthy of protection).
71 Under a literal reading of Katz, the Fourth Amendment should not afford the
home greater protection than anywhere else. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."), superseded
on other grounds by statute, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000), and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801 (2000). These two ideas-the Fourth Amendment affords the home special
treatment, and the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places-have been called
"mutually inconsistent." Sklansky, supra note 9, at 190.
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by the numerous post-Katz decisions holding police surveillance
directed at homes to be non-searches. 72 This suggests that Kyllo
did not mark an abrupt philosophical shift by the Court toward
expanded Fourth Amendment protections for the home. Rather,
its focus was less the Fourth Amendment security afforded any
one place, and more a broader fear that future technology-akin
to thermal imaging but significantly more invasive-would
profoundly diminish individual privacy. In fact, Justice Scalia
clearly identified this concern when he warned that "advancing
technology" would soon allow the government to "discern all
73
human activity in the home."
72 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986). The Court reasoned

that any citizen flying in the public airspace above the defendant's home could have
looked down and observed his marijuana plants. Id. Similarly, any dog-owning
member of the public could have walked their German Shepherd to the front door of
Rabb's home and-if the canine was properly trained-detected the presence of
marijuana inside. Granted, Ciraolo (as well as Kyllo) considered the extent to which
the disputed technology was "in general public use." See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 n.6,
40; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 ("In an age where private and commercial flight in the
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his
marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the
naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet."). The analogy is therefore simply meant to
stress the availability of both drug-detection canines and airplanes to the public.
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37-38, 40 (1988) (holding that garbage
generated inside a home and disposed of at a curb was not protected by the Fourth
Amendment); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-180 (1984) (reaffirming the
"open fields doctrine" whereby private land adjacent to a home does not merit Fourth
Amendment scrutiny); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (finding that
the government's use of a pen register to determine numbers dialed on a private
home phone did not comprise a Fourth Amendment search), superseded on other
grounds by statute, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510, 3121 (2000).
73 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36; see also id. at 36 n.3 (discussing surveillance
technology permitting law enforcement officers to see through walls); id. at 40
(proclaiming that the Court "must take the long view"); id. at 51 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for seeking to "craft an all-encompassing rule for
the future"); United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir. 1996)
(McKay, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the government's use of technology
and the "march of science" threaten privacy). The dissent in Cusumano-which
opposed the court's decision to treat thermal imaging of a home as a non-searchargued many of the same points that Justice Scalia later adopted in Kyllo. Compare,
e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 with Cusumano, 83 F.3d at 1258-61 (applying Katz test
and reaching same result); 533 U.S. at 35-36 with 83 F.3d at 1259-60 (stressing
that advancing technology threatens privacy); 533 U.S. at 37-38 with 83 F.3d at
1260 (reasoning that all details inside the home are intimate and worthy of Fourth
Amendment protection). It is therefore informative to note that the Cusamano
dissent specifically distinguished a sniff from an imager, reasoning that the latter
"lacks the [sniffs] precision" because "it empowers the government to detect a vast
array of innocent conduct." Id. at 1264-65. See generally State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d
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The Rabb court, however, misunderstood the nature of
Justice Scalia's fear, as evidenced by its comment that Kyllo was
"concerned with the use of advanced technology by law
enforcement." 74 The court correctly pointed out that a dog sniff
can be viewed as a type of advanced technology, given that the
snout, in comparison to the human nose, is a "far superior[]
sensory instrument." 75 Yet this was never in dispute. The issue
is not whether a dog sniff constitutes advanced technology in
some comparative sense, but whether, like a thermal imager, it
comprises a kind of "advancingtechnology." 76 The answer to this
latter question is a resounding no. 77 Use of the canine sense of
smell for hunting and law enforcement is a practice that
antedates even American history.78 The Kyllo majority was
surely aware of this fact, which probably explains its failure to
mention Place or dog sniffs even once. 79 More likely than not, the
Court presumed-given that Kyllo involved sophisticated
thermal imaging equipment,8 0 and given its own stated concern
for more invasive future surveillance technology8 '-that lower
courts would recognize its holding as wholly unrelated to its dog
82
sniff jurisprudence.
The Structure of Kyllo
The same result would have been reached in Kyllo even if
83
the target of the thermal imager was not a private residence,
B.

1175, 1201 (Gross, J., dissenting) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("The thermal imaging
device was not limited to discovering the presence or absence of contraband drugs.").
74 Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1184 (emphasis added).
75 Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985)).
76 See id. at 1183 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36).
77 See id. at 1202 (Gross, J., dissenting) (quoting Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d
989, 1037 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), affl'd, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004) for its
discussion of the use of dog sniffs in law enforcement dating back to the twelfth
century).
78 See Fitzgerald, 837 A.2d at 1037 ("[The dog sniff] is hardly a new or
unfamiliar investigative modality.").
79 See id. at 1036.
80

Thermal imagers are technologically sophisticated in comparison to dog

sniffs.

81 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47-48 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(warning that the majority's logic was potentially applicable to "mechanical
substitutes for dogs").
83 See Amanda S. Froh, Note, Rethinking Canine Sniffs: The Impact of Kyllo v.
United States, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337, 349-50 (2002) (supplying reasons why
Kyllo's result would be the same even if the thermal device was not pointed at a
82
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which disproves Rabb's claim that creation of a Fourth
Amendment search hinges on the government "endeavor[ing] at
all to employ sensory-enhancing methods to cross the firm line at
the entrance of a house."8 4 Post-Katz caselaw considers four
principal factors to decide whether a privacy expectation from
government interference is objectively reasonable.8 5 As stated, a
positive finding in this regard converts the interference into a
The four-part inquiry asks
Fourth Amendment search.8 6
whether: (1) the government surveillance technique is senseenhancing;8 7 (2) the area infiltrated is traditionally associated
with personal privacy; (3) the technique is widely available to the
public; and (4) the information could not be captured without
physical trespass if not for the assistance of the surveillance
88
device.
Although Kyllo did not explicitly adopt this four-part test, it
More
underpins the decision's reasoning and holding.8 9
importantly, application of thermal imaging to each prong yields
a result consistent with the existence of a Fourth Amendment
search: thermal imaging allows recognition of heat normally
invisible to the human eye; 90 the target of the scan was a private
residence; 9 1 the technology was not in general public use; 92 and
without the thermal imager the police could not have discerned
the heat level generated by the home's interior without unlawful

home).
84

State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).

85 See Froh, supra note 83, at 342-43.
86 Although this is the general rule, there are various warrant exceptions.
See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (finding that the
potential destruction of evidence created exigent circumstances that allowed for the
circumvention of the warrant requirement), superseded on other grounds by statute,

625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-501.2, ILL. VEH. CODE § 11-501.2(c)(2) (West 2002).
87 "A sense-enhanced search involves 'any police examination of a person or his
property through the use of some method that provides information not available to
unaided sensory perceptions.'" Steinberg, supra note 24, at 1087 (quoting David E.
Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563, 563 n.1
(1990)).
88 See Froh, supra note 83, at 342-43.
89 See id. at 349 n.103 ("[Tihis test is not laid out explicitly in the case, but
rather is gleaned from reading the decision as a whole.").
90 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (observing that thermal
imagers detect radiation "not visible to the naked eye").

91 See id.
92 See id. at 39 n.6 ("[W]e can quite confidently say that thermal imaging is not

'routine' ...").
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entrance. 93 That the target of the surveillance was a home
therefore constituted only one of four factors, each of which
supported the Court's holding that use of thermal imaging
technology triggered a Fourth Amendment event. 94
It is
therefore likely that the Kyllo Court would have reached the
same result even if the thermal imager had not been directed at a
home. 95
Consequently, Rabb's reliance on Kyllo for the
proposition that context underlies the Fourth Amendment
principle of limited disclosure-i.e., that Place and its progeny
are inapplicable in the context of the home-is misplaced.
C.

The Sui Generis Model and Supreme Court Precedent
Aside from Rabb's misapplication of Kyllo, there is no
additional Supreme Court caselaw that supports a departure
from the treatment of dog sniffs as sui generis. Some jurists and
scholars criticize the sui generis idea as unsound in light of
empirical evidence suggesting that canine sniffs generate high
rates of "false positives" when used in law enforcement
situations. 96 The Rabb court neither adopted nor even addressed
this criticism. The fact remains that literature positing the
inaccuracy of dog sniffs has existed for years, 97 and yet the
Supreme Court has chosen time and again to retain the sniffs
98
non-search status.
93 See id. at 35 n.2 ("[On the night of the scan] no outside observer could have
discerned the relative heat of Kyllo's home without thermal imaging.").
94 Furthermore, in Kyllo there was no physical invasion, the presence of which
previously justified the Court's heightened standard of Fourth Amendment
protection for the home. See Froh, supra note 83, at 350.
95 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 615 (1980) (White, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Fourth Amendment is concerned with protecting people, not places, and no
talismanic significance is given to the fact that an arrest occurs in the home rather
than elsewhere.").
96 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction.").
97 At a minimum, critics can point to cases as far back as 1979 in support of this
claim of inaccuracy. See Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979)
(discussing the strip-search of a junior high school student upon a canine alert to the
presence of drugs in which narcotics were not found and the sniffee was later
discovered to have been playing with a pet dog in heat on the morning prior to the
incident).
98 One year prior to Kyllo, the Court briefly reaffirmed the sui generis model in
Indianapolisv. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (holding that a dog sniff around the
exterior of a car did not convert a Fourth Amendment seizure into a search). Four
years after Kyllo, the Court again upheld this dual-prong rationale-limited
disclosure and non-intrusiveness-for dog sniffs directed at automobiles. See
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Moreover, those who argue that recognition of the sniffs
fallibility "ends the justification claimed in Place for treating the
sniff as sui generis 9 9 overlook an important idea expounded upon
in United States v. Jacobsen: "[T]he likelihood that [dog sniffs or
drug tests] will actually compromise any legitimate interest in
privacy seems much too remote to characterize the testing as a
search subject to the Fourth Amendment.""'
The Court thus
conceded that sniffs sometimes generate false positives and, as a
result, expose otherwise constitutionally protected items to public
view. A marginal error rate is presumably not thought to justify
1
the burden on law enforcement' 0 '-particularly
for enforcement
of drug laws-of even a limited probable cause requirement for
10 2
dog sniffs.
D. The DiviningRod Theory and the Launching PadIdea
10 3 of
Rabb ignores that a privacy expectation in the secretion
evidence of a crime is per se unreasonable, 10 4 and that, standing
alone, it can never merit Fourth Amendment protection. Arnold
Loewy discussed this idea in The FourthAmendment as a Device
for Protecting the Innocent.10 5 He began with the premise that
there is no Fourth Amendment right to be secure from the
government finding evidence of a crime because no privacy
interest exists in the possession of, or the participation in, per se
unlawful items or activities. 0 6 Loewy posited that if science
could invent an "evidence-detecting divining rod" that, for
example, "accurately detected weapons and did not disrupt the
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (finding that a dog sniff outside a car does not impinge
constitutionally protected privacy interests); supra note 41 (examining Caballes).
99 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting).
100 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (emphasis added).
101 See Loewy, supra note 12, at 1234 ("The importance of solving crime cannot
be gainsaid. It is one of the most critical functions that a government can perform.").
102 Especially given that most erroneous canine alerts result from "inadequate
handler training." Bird, supra note 5, at 423-25 (1997) (emphasis added) (addressing
cases such as Renfrow in which handlers were unpaid volunteers); see supranote 97
(discussing Renfrow).
103 See Loewy, supra note 12, at 1229 ("[Tlhere is no [F]ourth [A]mendment
right to secrete [evidence of a crime;] ...the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects does not include the right to be secure from the
government's finding evidence of a crime.").
104 See generally supra note 41.
105 Loewy, supra note 12, at 1245-46.
106 See id. (protecting marijuana scent from police detection is hardly a
"powerful" Fourth Amendment claim).
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normal movement of people, there could be no [F]ourth
[A]mendment objection to its use." 10 7 This "divining rod theory"
is simply an illustrative restatement of the sui generis concept
born in Place.08 Not only is a sniff (of property) extremely unintrusive, 10 9 but the inquiry that it implicates is binaryl' 0-a
simple "contraband 'yea' or 'nay.' " 1 Thus, if one assumes that
contraband possession is unlawful wherever it occurs," 2 narrow
information-capture prevents the sniff from infringing any
3
legitimate privacy interest."

107 Id.
at 1244-47. Interestingly, Loewy theorized that a divining rod would
separate the innocent from the guilty. See id. at 1246. Its use would thereby free
innocent persons from the government's "unwarranted suspicion" that they
participated in criminal activity. Id. at 1247. In response to the claim that
Americans have a constitutional right to be free from unwarranted governmental
suspicion anyway, Loewy argued that if such were true, there would exist a "catch22 in which police could not search because they did not have probable cause [or
reasonable suspicion] and could not investigate in order to establish probable cause
[or reasonable suspicion] because suspicion would thereby be cast on the individual
unjustly." Id. at 1247 n.85. The absence of such a constitutional right reinforces the
idea that a dog sniff-to the extent it operates like a divining rod-actually has a
salutary effect by liberating the sniffee from law enforcement's otherwise
"unjustifiable suspicion." Id. at 1247-48. One objection to the divining rod theory is
that certain criminal laws-such as those for marijuana possession-exist in order
to satisfy society's moral obligations, yet remain largely "unenforced because we
want to continue our conduct," i.e., using marijuana. Id. at 1248 n.86 (quoting
Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE
L.J. 1, 14 (1932)). To that, Loewy counters: "If the employment of crime-detecting
devices such as marijuana-sniffing dogs causes us to rethink that which we outlaw,
it is an argument in favor of, and not against, such a use." Id.
108 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) ("A chemical test
that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not
compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.") (emphasis added).
109 But see supra note 12 (commenting that a sniff directed at one's person
instead of property may indeed be intrusive).
110 Fitzgerald v. Maryland, 837 A.2d 989, 1031 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (citing
United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
111 Id. at 1030.
112 Surprisingly,
the Rabb court was unwilling to make this very logical
assumption, instead reasoning that because the marijuana scent originated inside
the defendant's home, it was an "intimate detail" of that house, no less so than the
ambient temperature inside Kyllo's house. State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175, 1183 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006). One wonders whether the court would have reached this
conclusion had the scent emanating from Rabb's home been that of a chemical
weapon, such as sarin or cyanide.
113 Cf. Fitzgerald, 837 A.2d
at 1030 ("The rationale of Place and of
Jacobsen... had absolutely nothing to do with the locus either 1) of where the dog
sniffing took place or 2) of where the subjective expectation of privacy was being
entertained.").

1140

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1123

Some object that the limited information-capture rationale
information
violates a basic Fourth Amendment principle:
yielded from an unlawful search cannot then inform the
justifiability of that same search.11 4 For example, the phone
conversation at issue in Katz was held constitutionally protected,
and yet application of Place's limited disclosure principle to the
facts of that case-where the defendant's words were themselves
per se unlawfuln"5 -would seem to produce an opposite result.
However, Caballes' reasoning-a thermal imager is unlike a dog
sniff because the former can reveal innocent details about its
target 1 6 -helps invalidate this argument. This dichotomy-i.e.,
surveillance that can only detect unlawful information, and that
which can capture lawful, intimate details-resolves the
contradiction implicit in the idea that while a speaker never has
a legitimate privacy interest in criminal speech," 7 government
wiretapping of that same unlawful speech is nevertheless a
Fourth Amendment search. This is because just as a thermal
imager senses all heat lost, 1 8 a wiretap intercepts all language
114

Froh, supra note 83, at 356 & n.144 (reading United States v. Jacobsen, 466

U.S. 109 (1984) as holding that "persons engaging in private illegal activity have
relinquished their expectation of privacy with respect to the illegal
product... [because the] result of a search cannot play a part in determining
whether the search was justified" (citing Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29
(1927))); see also Gutterman, supra note 13, at 709 & n.341 ("A search prosecuted in
violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light." (quoting
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927))).
115 See Hope Walker Hall, Comment, Sniffing Out the Fourth Amendment:
United States v. Place-Dog Sniffs-Ten Years Later, 46 ME. L. REV. 151, 182 (1994)
("Katz [had] a legitimate expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation,
regardless of the illegality of the content of that conversation. Place, on the other
hand, was afforded no legitimate expectation of privacy .... Here is a classic case
of... 'doublethink.'" (citing John M. Burkoff, When is a Search Not a "Search?"
FourthAmendment Doublethink, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 515 (1984))).
116 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (quoting Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001), for the idea that an imager can detect what time of
day the "lady of the house" takes her daily bath). Kyllo stood for the proposition that
inside the home "all details are intimate details," no matter how trivial they might
seem. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (emphasis in original). It is not up to judges, nor police,
to distinguish between what is, and what is not, an intimate detail. See id. at 38-39.
117 See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. See generally Loewy, supra
note 12, at 1244-46 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is only implicated when
the search can detect not just evidence of a crime, but also intimate, innocent
details).
118 The detection of heat loss permits discernment of "distinguishable heat
signatures inside the structure," in that it is "indicative of the amount of energy
expended by the occupants of [the] building." United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d
1247, 1257 & n.13 (10th Cir. 1996).
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spoken-both lawful'1 9 and unlawful. 120 Viewed in this light,
what protected Katz's conversation from government surveillance
121
was the prospect of innocent speech.
A dog sniff, on the other hand, is distinguishable from both a
wiretap and a thermal imager in its capacity to reveal only
evidence of a crime. 122 Context would therefore inform its
search/non-search status in one situation only: when the site of
the
sniff-the
so-called
"launching
pad"123-is
itself
constitutionally protected.124 The issue is whether the launching
pad is a "place covered by the Fourth Amendment,"125 and the
determinative factor' 26 -be it inside an airport terminal, as in
Place,12 7 or outside a private home, as in Rabb 2 8 -is the legality
119 "1 will pay you $25 to pick up my wife at the theater."
120 "I will pay you $25,000 to kill my wife at the theater."
121 This reasoning is consistent with the divining rod theory and the idea that
there is no right to secrete evidence of a crime. See Loewy, supra note 12, at 1229. If
the government somehow invented a divining rod that could monitor all human
speech and recognize only those statements evincing evidence of a crime-without
processing and understanding non-criminal speech-there could be no Fourth
Amendment objection to its use. See id. at 1246. The device would essentially
function like a dog sniff for human speech. This idea, however, should at once seem
counterintuitive. Words are not understood in isolation; we interpret them based
upon the context and structure of the sentences in which they appear. This is why
human speech is so fundamentally unlike a sniff in its capacity to reveal evidence of
a crime. On the one hand, the smell of contraband triggers a distinct and
unmistakable reaction in the sniffer, as if a pattern of the target substance is
imprinted in the mind. On the other hand, speech requires interpretation of words
based upon their context and structure, without which words are meaningless.
Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment must protect all speech-even that which is per
se unlawful-because it is not the government's job to distinguish between
"intimate" and "non-intimate" speech. Cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38-39.
122 See supra note 13.
123Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1024-26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), affd,
864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).
124 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
125 Fitzgerald, 837 A.2d at 1026 (reasoning that so long as the launching pad is
constitutionally unprotected "the police could have been on the most baseless or
random of fishing expeditions and it would be beyond [the court's] area of concern").
126

The higher level of justification required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment
when it applies ...is not to be confused with the very different issue of
whether the amendment applies. Even the enhanced protection of the home
is still limited to being a protection against "unreasonable searches and
seizures." It is not a protection against non-searches and non-seizures,
reasonable or unreasonable.
Id. at 1030.
127 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983).
128 See supra note 33-34 and accompanying text.
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of the police presence at the site of the sniff. 129 And as the Rabb
dissent pointed out, the drug-detection dog in that case clearly
stood on constitutionally unprotected ground.130
E.

"Passive"and "Active" Technology

A sniff is a form of "passive," as opposed to "active,"
surveillance/investigative technology.131
A device that uses
active technology generates its own feedback in order to provide

129 See Fitzgerald, 837 A.2d at 1029 ("As long as the observing person or the
sniffing canine are legally present at their vantage when their respective senses are
aroused by obviously incriminating evidence, a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment has not occurred." (quoting United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644,
649 (6th Cir. 1998))). See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 42 (2001)
(explaining that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection" and citing various
caselaw); State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175, 1193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (Gross, J.,
dissenting) ('The Fourth Amendment does not necessarily protect areas of a home
which are 'open and exposed to public view.'" (quoting State v. Duhart, 810 So.2d
972, 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002))). One could argue that the launching pad idea
embodies a return to pre-Katz jurisprudence, in that it relies on the property-based
notion of trespass. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("[T]he
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."); Sklansky, supra note 9, at 155
(commenting that Katz embodied a "new, ahistorical approach" to the Fourth
Amendment in its departure from the antiquated focus on common law trespass);
supra note 16 (discussing the significance of Katz). At least one scholar contends,
however, that the focus on property rights under the Fourth Amendment has
remained practically unabated since Katz. See Kerr, supra note 16, at 820. Kerr
posits that the post.Katz Supreme Court has continued to adhere to the propertybased common law in deciding Fourth Amendment issues. Id. ("Katz did not
revolutionize Fourth Amendment law, but merely reemphasized the loose propertybased approach announced in [an earlier case]."). For example, an expectation of
privacy is normally found objectively "reasonable" under the second prong of the
Katz test only when it is supported by a real property-based right to exclude. See id.
at 809-10. The author also interpreted the facts of Katz itself as consistent with the
idea that in paying for a phone call, Katz leased a temporary privacy right within
the phone booth. See id. at 822-23. This notion of" 'momentary' property rights," id.
at 823, helps explain such cases as California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986)
(involving police flight over private land), in which an arguably intrusive
governmental surveillance technique-yet one that infringed no traditionalproperty
right-was held a non-search under the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 228 (concluding that aerial photography of an
industrial complex was not a Fourth Amendment search).
130Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1193 (Gross, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 123-25.
See generally Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1194 (Gross, J., dissenting) ("Here, the front door of
the residence was on a direct path from the public street, about twenty or thirty feet
in. As the dog and the detectives stood at the front door, prior to inhaling, there was
no constitutional violation.").
131 See generally Vernick et al., supra note 11.
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sensory-enhancement. 132 In contrast, one that relies on passive
technology detects energy already emitted by its target.133
Passive technology is therefore physically non-invasive 3 4 and, as
a result, is less likely to implicate Fourth Amendment privacy
interests. This is especially true when a passive device is used on
a living thing, in that to find a Fourth Amendment search, a
court would "have to rely on a less tangible conception of bodily
135
integrity"-i.e., a "metaphysical privacy interest" of sorts.
It is not submitted that the use of passive technology is
categorically exempt from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Kyllo
itself disproves this proposition, since the Court even found a
search when federal agents aimed a thermal imager, a
prototypical passive device, 136 at an inanimate object. 137 Yet
recall that both Kyllo and Caballes stressed the imager's ability
to detect innocent, intimate details.' 38 This suggests that only
after courts first distinguish the sniff on the basis of its
exceptionally narrow information-capture 39 does the extent of its
invasiveness, or lack thereof, become a factor in deciding whether
a search exists. Under this view, the passive/active dichotomy
played no role in Kyllo because the Court focused exclusively on
what it considered the imager's most glaring constitutional flaw:
its ability to expose legitimately private information to public
Id. at 569.
Id.
134 See id. at 571 ("[Active devices] emito energy directed at the target... and
therefore pose[] health or other risks.. . [while passive technology] pose[s] no
greater health threat than other electronic devices.").
135 Id.
(noting that scanners based on passive technology "are not physically
intrusive, and that courts have not recognized a metaphysical privacy interest with
respect to [many] electronic devices used by police"); cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 43-44 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[The notion that heat emissions from the outside of a dwelling are a
private matter implicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment ... is
not only unprecedented but also quite difficult to take seriously. Heat
waves, like aromas that are generated in a kitchen, or in a laboratory or
opium den, enter the public domain if and when they leave a building.
Id.
136 See
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30 ("Thermal imagers detect infrared
radiation ... operat[ing] somewhat like a video camera showing heat images.").
137 Id.
at 40 (holding that use of a thermal imager is a Fourth Amendment
"search").
138 See supra notes 41, 116 and accompanying text. See generally Kyllo, 533 U.S.
at 37-38 (stating that details inside the home are intimate).
139 The heat escaping from Kyllo's home could have been caused by virtually
anythingcapable of generating heat.
132

133
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view. 140 Yet upon inquiring into the constitutional status of a
surveillance/investigative technique that already meets the
limited information-capture standard-such as a dog sniff when
performed outside of a home-the passive/active distinction
would be of renewed importance, because a sniffs reliance on
passive technology'4' defeats the claim that a drug-detection dog
seeks to, and in fact succeeds at, "cross[ing] the 'firm line' of
Fourth Amendment protection at the door of [a] house." 142 In
fact, as Judge Gross wrote in his Rabb dissent, the exact opposite
was true: "[I]t was the constitutionally unprotected odor of
contraband that crossed the threshold of the home to the dog's
nose .... "143
CONCLUSION

State v. Rabb was decided incorrectly: a dog sniff is a nonsearch so long as it is performed from a constitutionally
unprotected launching pad. First, the court's focus on Kyllo is
misplaced.
Kyllo addressed the threat of futuristic, ultrainvasive technology, a category inapplicable to the sniff.
Moreover, it misread Kyllo as signifying that the target of
government surveillance informs its search/non-search status.
Context was only one among many factors that contributed to the
Kyllo holding, and the Court would have reached the same result
had the focus of the scan not been a house. Second, there is no
Supreme Court precedent that suggests an intent to abandon the
sui generis model, flawed as it may be. This is especially true
when the focus of a sniff is an inanimate object like a house.
Third, provided that the sniff is performed from constitutionally
unprotected ground, it infringes no legitimate privacy interest.
This is consistent with the idea that the Fourth Amendment does
not validate privacy expectations in per se unlawful property or
activity. Finally, because the sniff comprises a type of passive
technology, the argument that its use somehow breaches the
"firm line at the entrance to the house" is patently untrue. The
140 See supra note 41 (discussing the difference between 'legitimacy" and
"reasonableness").
141 Recall that passive devices interpret energy already emitted by their targets.
See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
142 State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175, 1184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); see also supra
note 73 & accompanying text.
143 Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1199 (Gross, J., dissenting).
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dog sniff is a unique and vital law enforcement technique, and its
Fourth Amendment character is generally unaffected by the
location in which it occurs.
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